Some F.O.O.D For Thought
A small change in logic, not so much a change in rates
A core plank of the F.O.O.D thesis is the role of tariffs as the enabling mechanism on which everything else rests. Once industries are constructed behind tariff protection, they calcify - no innovation, no technological progress, no ambition beyond the status quo. This is why the Sugar Babies do not bother planting sugar cane, since processing and refining it is too much of a hassle. It is why the Terrible Twins of Palm Oil cannot even be bothered to change the eyesore packaging in which they sell their products. And it is why the Kings of Cement have been selling the same product in the same form for more than two decades - and have earned large fortunes doing so.
It follows, then, that rolling back tariff protection - and replacing it with a different kind of government support, one that enables rather than insulates - has to be the starting point for removing this handbrake on Nigeria's economic development. (Note: development, not growth. The two are not the same thing.)
Which way, Tariff Man?
Nigeria's Finance Ministry recently released a new list of Fiscal Policy Measures and Tariff Amendments for 2026, as approved by the President. The best way to describe the changes is as a selective retreat from the most damaging parts of Nigeria's protectionism. In that sense, the biggest line in the gazette is not any specific tariff cut but the commitment to reduce the Import Adjustment Tariff (IAT) every year starting in 2027, until it is fully eliminated by 2036. The IAT is the most punitive and arbitrary component of the tariff regime, so signalling its eventual removal is directionally good. Of course, 2036 is a long way off - enough time for Nigeria to elect another leader who believes tariff walls are the road to economic development (the supply of such politicians in Nigeria is unlimited) - so it would have been better to move faster. But you take what you can.
Another small positive is that when you compare this 2026 FPM with the one from 2023 [PDF], you see a reduction in the number of items on the import prohibition list. In 2023 there were 26 such items. In 2026 the number down to 17. The clearest removals are the old bans on spaghetti and noodles, fruit juice in retail packs, tomato ketchup and sauces, retreaded and used tyres, carpets and rugs, all types of footwear, bags and suitcases, used compressors and air-conditioning units, and used motor vehicles above twelve years old. All of these appear in the 2023 prohibition schedule and are absent from the 2026 one. Dropping off the prohibition list does not mean zero duty - it simply means these goods move back into the tariff regime instead of facing an outright non-ECOWAS ban.
On food and drink, the interesting removals are noodles, fruit juice, tomato sauces, and beer and stout. In 2023, beer and stout were bundled into the broader beverages ban; in 2026, the prohibition remains for non-alcoholic beverages, but beer and stout have disappeared from the schedule entirely. I suppose this is good news for the Philistines who drink this stuff. Personally I’d rather drink dishwater than stout but to each their own.
The one notable new prohibition is corrugated flat-rolled steel sheets (nothing is ever random with these things so you can guess that someone lobbied to put it in there). That item is in the 2026 prohibition list and not in the 2023 one.
Back in 2023 there were 102 items on the national list of reduced-duty items. In 2026 that number has grown to 127. In 2023 there was a broad catch-all concession for “chemical inputs for the production of agro-chemicals.” In 2026 that umbrella line disappears, and instead you get a longer list of named compounds and intermediates. So the policy is moving from broad concessions to targeted, line-by-line relief. That is more technocratic, but it also gives government more discretion over who benefits.
There is a new food/feed block for prepared or preserved poultry meat/offal, drink-industry flavouring/extract inputs (2106.90.92.00), and animal-feed preparations, including vitamin premixes and other feed preparations (2309.90.10.00 and 2309.90.90.00). That is a fairly clear poultry/livestock and food-processing lobbying (they have been complaining very loudly, with some justification, it must be said). A lot of these come in at 0% or 5%.
There also seems to be a move away from tariffs on raw materials more broadly. This shows up across the board: crude palm oil versus refined vegetable oil, raw sugar versus retail sugar packs, bulk clinker versus bagged cement, urea versus NPK blends. The logic is straightforward that if you bring in the raw materials or intermediate goods for production in Nigeria, we will not hassle you. It all sounds sensible, and it is hardly a new idea, but the devil will always be in the implementation.
That’s the general view and direction. Let us walk through some of the specific items we covered in the F.O.O.D series.
Sugar
This is one of the more meaningful changes on paper. Most of the affected sugar lines move from 70% in 2023 to 55–57.5% in 2026. But the non-ECOWAS prohibition on retail refined sugar packs remains; the USDA estimates that domestic production still accounts for less than 5% of consumption; raw sugar imports are still effectively tied to backward-integration participants; and household use is less than 20% of total sugar demand, with industry taking the rest. So this is not really a change directed at lowering prices for consumers. It is best interpreted as a modest easing for refiners and industrial users.
That is pretty much an admission that the National Sugar Master Plan (NSMP) has not worked. The NSMP has missed its goals after fifteen years, with imports still covering roughly 95% of supply and raw sugar imports forecast at 2.0 million metric tonnes in MY2026/27, according to the USDA. The tariff trim is sensible, I suppose, but it should be taken as evidence that backward integration has not worked. Its been almost two decades now and the clock really should start counting down on this policy if it is unable to deliver over the next few years.
Wheat
This is the biggest area where any "reform" narrative falls apart. In the gazette, the relevant line is wheat or meslin flour, and it stays at 70%, exactly where it was in 2023. On flour, there is basically no change to speak of. Meanwhile, USDA expects Nigeria to import 7.2 million metric tonnes of wheat in MY2026/27, and notes that flour milled from local wheat is generally not suitable for bread, pasta, or noodles because of low protein content. The binding constraint is still agronomy and quality.
For the sake of full accuracy, some wheat easing happened in 2024 when the 2024 zero-duty wheat import waiver lowered costs well into 2025, and some mills operating in free trade zones also benefited from lower landed costs. But the 2026 FPM remains a maintenance of the status quo and nothing else.
Addendum: I’m told that ‘Durum Wheat Seed (for sowing)’ has had its IAT completely removed (from 15% to zero) hence it no longer appears on the list which only includes items with IAT applicable.
Palm Oil
This cut is directionally sound and, unlike wheat, actually says something. Crude palm oil moves from 35% in 2023 to 28.75% in 2026, while refined vegetable oil stays on the non-ECOWAS prohibition list. Once again, the idea seems to be allowing feedstock in while reserving refining for local players. The external context is that the CBN had already lifted foreign-exchange restrictions on 43 commodities in October 2023, including palm oil products, and the USDA noted back in 2024 that significant black-market inflows were already coming through neighbouring countries to evade duties above 35%.
Maybe the reason the palm oil cut is modest is that the palm oil guys clearly knew what was coming and took to the newspapers to disturb the peace with warnings of impending “doom” if imports were allowed to come in “unchecked”. In general this is something to be mindful of when you see stories in the newspapers - apply the necessary amount of skepticism and remember how long a lot of these sectors have been supported with not much to show for it other than profits to shareholders.
Cement
Elections are coming. The big daddies were left alone. Are these two things related? I don’t know, you tell me. The bulk and clinker lines remain at 50%, just as in 2023, and bagged cement stays on the import prohibition list where it has been for two decades or so. That is of course very hard to defend as infant-industry logic at this point. By the companies' own stated figures, Dangote has 35.25 million tonnes per annum of capacity in Nigeria, BUA has 17 million, and Lafarge has 10.5 million. Taken together, that is roughly 63 million tonnes of installed capacity, while Dangote says Nigeria consumed a little over 28 million tonnes in 2025. As I documented in Defensive Capacity, we know why they keep adding capacity they seemingly have no intention of using.
Urea
Urea does not appear as a headline protected line, while NPK fertiliser remains on the prohibition list. NEPC says urea brought in $1.29 billion in non-oil exports in 2025, second only to cocoa. So fertiliser policy now looks more like: export the upstream nutrient where Nigeria is competitive, but protect the downstream blending and finishing stage at home. But as we know, Nigerian farmers are paying the price for this with terribly low usage rates of fertiliser that is more valuable to be exported (especially with government gas subsidies) than sold to them.
Conclusion
As I said at the start, the best signal to read from this document is a change in logic and not really a change in rates. The country remains very protectionist but the protection is being applied a bit more selectively. And in areas like sugar and palm oil, the tariff cuts are really acknowledgements of domestic shortfall and policy failure. One can only hope that this is a sign of better changes to come.
Finally, for the love of God, the Finance Ministry should put more time into reading through its documents before publishing them. Given what is at stake, the circular itself is really quite sloppy. As one example, the descriptions given on page 3 to Annex II and Annex III do not match the actual annex titles later in the document.
Anyway, one small step for man.