In a previous post (see link below), I discussed Nigeria's deepening food and hunger crisis, which persists despite the global rise in food production. I argued that this crisis is not inevitable but reflects the absence of deliberate, well-informed policy choices. I want to revisit the issue to address a particular mindset prevalent among policymakers and influential voices in public discourse.
This mindset rests on three flawed assumptions:
That we must return to an era when most people grew their food;
Agriculture is a simple, labour-intensive activity requiring only land and farmers;
Food sufficiency depends on drawing more people into farming.
These ideas, however, have been decisively disproven by the history of agricultural development over the past two centuries.
It’s true that agriculture once dominated human activity. Over time, though, societies evolved: cities arose, economies diversified, manufacturing grew, and technological breakthroughs revolutionized production. Between 1800 and 2000, the global population surged sevenfold, yet food output soared tenfold—shattering Malthusian fears of widespread famine. This agricultural triumph didn’t come from sending people back to the fields but from boosting productivity through innovation.
Modern agriculture thrives on technical advances: mechanization, scientific crop breeding, superior seed varieties, and more efficient fertilizers. In advanced economies, productivity skyrocketed as agricultural jobs plummeted. Economic historian Giovanni Federico notes that while agriculture claimed 75% of the workforce in many nations during the 1800s, it now employs under 5%1. This shift freed labour for other industries, fueling economic growth and raising living standards.
In Africa, the story differs sharply. Agriculture still reigns, accounting for about 20% of GDP and employing nearly half the workforce. Yet productivity lags. For over fifty years, farming there has remained mostly small-scale and subsistence-based. Almost 80% of Africa’s poor rely on smallholder farming, and yields have dropped in many areas. A recent study spanning six countries found annual productivity falling 3.5% and yields shrinking 3.9%.2
This stagnation isn’t solely due to natural limits. Structural barriers—like limited credit access, inefficient markets, and weak infrastructure—have contributed. But the root problem runs deeper: African states have consistently failed to develop the institutional strength needed for agricultural progress. Governments have faltered in delivering critical public goods—irrigation systems, agricultural research, quality seeds, and advisory services—that drove breakthroughs elsewhere.
A recent interview with the president of the National Onion Producers, Processors and Marketers Association of Nigeria (yes, this is a lobby group that exists) provides a good snapshot of the problem.
Would you say the government, policy or intervention has worsened the onion supply crisis?
Sometimes I don’t know where it goes wrong. It is not that the government doesn’t have good programmes. In the dreamt programme, when you study it, you will think they are being instructed by God to carry out that, but the problem is with implementation. When the government appoints someone to implement a programme, the moment the person assumes office, he thinks the programme belongs to them.
Then they start bringing sentiment, nepotism, and all sorts of things. A Federal Government project is supposed to be done with utmost patriotism, professionalism, and so on. When all the key performance indicators showed a negative trend, I started writing to the government.
I wrote and followed up, but nobody listened. I wrote to the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, and the National Emergency Management Agency. I can assure you that none of them responded. When we have good interventions, we should be sincere with the implementation. That is where we have the problem. Those interventions are not properly implemented and along the line, a lot of things happen.
This institutional weakness mirrors a wider struggle with state capacity across many African nations. Feeble institutions hamper not just agricultural modernisation but also advancements in education, healthcare, and industrial growth. Some analysts blame historical legacies for these shortcomings, yet history alone doesn’t account for the ongoing failure to build capacity. The real question is why, despite investments and stated goals, many countries keep chasing policies that sidestep root issues.
The answer often stems from misdiagnosis. Policymakers frequently embrace external, one-size-fits-all models that ignore local conditions and realities.3 Policy confusion, inertia, and susceptibility to narrow interests ensue, derailing reforms and locking in stagnation. Agriculture stands out as the most glaring victim of this deeper malaise.
For the past fifty years, African policymakers have largely sidelined agriculture in favour of an industrialisation-first approach to economic development. The prevailing assumption has been that modernisation requires shifting labour from agriculture into urban-based industries, mirroring the trajectory of advanced economies. However, this approach overlooks a critical lesson from successful economic transformations elsewhere: industrial growth has often been preceded by, or at least accompanied by, deliberate agricultural modernisation. Rural development was not treated as an afterthought in places like Taiwan and South Korea but as a strategic priority.4 Land reforms, state-supported farmer cooperatives, and government-led modernisation campaigns increased productivity, raised rural incomes, and strengthened domestic markets—creating the conditions necessary for broader economic transformation.
The assumption that agriculture is a low-value, subsistence sector ignores its potential as a driver of economic growth. The most successful transformations have not relied on subsistence farming or large-scale corporate agriculture but on expanding small commercial farms.5 When these farms are supported with infrastructure, access to credit, and market integration, they generate rising incomes that stimulate demand for goods and services beyond agriculture. This multiplier effect fuels broader economic activity, increasing employment and lifting rural populations from poverty. Where agricultural growth has exceeded 4–5% annually, it has played a decisive role in driving industrial expansion, not merely as a supplier of raw materials but as a foundation for domestic consumer markets and rural-urban linkages.
Africa’s failure to prioritise agricultural development has had long-term consequences, from food insecurity to sluggish economic growth. Unlike countries that strategically used agriculture to launch broader economic transformation, many African governments have failed to build the necessary institutional framework to support commercial farming. Investments in rural infrastructure, research, and market access remain weak, preventing smallholder farmers from transitioning into commercially viable enterprises. Development strategies often assume that industrialisation alone would generate the structural change needed for sustained growth. Still, industrial expansion has remained fragile and unevenly distributed without a strong agricultural base. Reversing this trajectory requires recognising agriculture not as a sector to be left behind but as the very foundation of long-term economic transformation.
A renewed focus on agriculture is essential for Africa’s economic transformation. The assumption that industrialisation and large-scale infrastructure investment alone will drive growth has not delivered the expected results. Many African economies remain heavily dependent on raw commodity exports while manufacturing sectors struggle to compete with lower-cost producers in Asia.6 The experience of other regions suggests that sustained economic transformation requires strong linkages between agriculture and industry rather than treating them as separate paths to development. Agricultural reforms preceded industrial takeoff in countries that successfully modernised, such as Taiwan and South Korea. These reforms raised rural incomes, improved food security, and created domestic demand for manufactured goods, laying the foundation for broad-based economic growth. By contrast, Africa’s neglect of agriculture has weakened its structural transformation, leaving large rural populations trapped in subsistence farming and poverty.
This failure stems partly from development models that misdiagnose Africa’s comparative advantage. Many governments have prioritised infrastructure-heavy industrialisation strategies without considering how they align with existing economic conditions. Africa has abundant arable land but relatively high labour costs in manufacturing compared to Asia, making export-led industrialisation more challenging. A more effective approach would be modernising small-scale commercial farming, boosting productivity and rural incomes. Research has shown that growth driven by upgrading smallholder farming has stronger poverty-reducing effects than manufacturing-led growth. Agricultural modernisation does not mean a return to subsistence farming; instead, it means supporting small commercial farmers with improved infrastructure, market access, financial services, and technical innovation. This approach can create a dynamic rural economy that fuels broader industrial growth by increasing demand for agricultural machinery, transport, and processing industries.
However, repositioning agriculture requires more than state-led policies—it demands grassroots mobilisation. History shows that farmer-led movements have been crucial in shaping agricultural policies. In the United States, 19th-century farmers actively lobbied for state intervention, leading to the establishment of agricultural research institutions, land-grant colleges, and policy frameworks that modernised farming. 7Similarly, in Africa, grassroots movements such as the "Agbekoya" rebellion in Nigeria demonstrated the power of farmer activism. In the late 1960s, Yoruba peasant farmers protested unfair taxation and government neglect, forcing authorities to respond to their demands. Their mobilisation was not just about economic survival but about asserting the political importance of agriculture. These historical examples highlight the need for a genuine agricultural political constituency to organise and advocate for policies prioritising agricultural transformation—rather than the current coalition of traders only interested in capturing rents from higher domestic prices.
A bottom-up agricultural movement ensures policy changes are not dictated solely by external donors or disconnected state bureaucracies. The focus must be on empowering farmers to shape agricultural reforms that address their real challenges. This means strengthening farmer cooperatives, improving rural financial systems, and decentralising agricultural governance so that decision-making is closer to those directly involved in farming. A revitalised agricultural sector, driven by state support and grassroots activism, can provide the foundation for a more resilient and inclusive economic transformation. Africa’s path to prosperity does not lie in bypassing agriculture but in recognising its central role in economic development.
Feeding the World: An Economic History of Agriculture, 1800–2000 by Giovanni Federico
Smallholder farmers’ crop yields and productivity are failing to rise in sub-Saharan Africa
Building State Capability - Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock
Mobilizing for Development: The Modernization of Rural East Asia by Kristen E. Looney
Agricultural Development and Economic Transformation: Promoting Growth with Poverty Reduction by John W. Mellor
Africa’s Infrastructure-Led Growth Experiment Is Faltering. It Is Time to Focus on Agriculture - David Ndii
Grassroots Leviathan: Agricultural Reform and the Rural North in the Slaveholding Republic by Ariel Ron
Thanks for the post mate, interesting read. Having followed Chinese agricultural modernisation it seems like the key drivers were cooperatives of large enough size so that some degree of specialisation could occur (ie marketers, accountants etc within the farming cooperative) along with strong government incentives for mechanisation and performance based subsidies for high output farmers. Do you know where Nigeria is at with regards to cooperative registrations amongst farmers ? Do you have any data on how big and well coordianted the average cooperative is ? Have their ever been any performance based subsidies in Nigeria for high output ?
Blessed reading this